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Abstract: A viatical settlement (or viatical) is a transaction in which an investor pur-
chases the life insurance policy from a terminally ill person for a lump sum so that 
the investor can receive those benefits at the time of death. While there is an ongoing 
debate in the insurance and financial planning industry about viaticals, including the 
ethics of this practice, the focus has been predominantly on abuses (i.e., the practice 
of buying and selling viaticals) and less on the fundamental ethicality of the economic 
idea behind viaticals. This paper offers a systematic ethical analysis of viaticals that 
leverages the distinction between the ethicality of an economic idea and the ethical-
ity of economic reality to isolate and discuss the fundamental ethical problems of 
viaticals. By unpacking the evaluative content of our negative emotional reactions to 
viaticals, we show that, even under ideal circumstances, the economic idea of viaticals 
is, at its core, unethical.
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Introduction
A viatical settlement (or viatical) is a transaction in which an investor purchases 
the life insurance policy from a terminally ill person for a lump sum so that the 
investor can receive those benefits at the time of death. Viatical transactions have 
provoked a variety of responses. On the one hand, Quinn,1 in her important study, 
describes the changing moral perceptions in the viatical market, and reveals that 
many of those perceptions point to the inherent immorality associated with ben-
efiting economically from the suffering of others. Trinkhaus and Giacalone2 also 
speak of “entrepreneurial ‘mining’ of the dying” and highlight several ethical is-
sues that might arise in the economic transactions surrounding the final stages of 
life. On the other hand, the moral perceptions of many participating in this indus-
try are more positive and focus on the benefits to the dying or changing attitudes 
toward death among the public.3
The development of the viatical industry has been quite rapid and the fore-
casts indicate that viaticals are becoming less of a fringe product. As of 2002, 
there were already forty-five viatical settlement companies purchasing policies.4 
Sanford C. Bernstein & Company estimated that in 2005 the market for “used” 
policies topped $13 billion and could hit $160 billion by 2030.5 Despite the in-
creased use of viaticals and the ongoing debate in the insurance and financial 
planning industry about such transactions, most articles that discuss the ethical 
concerns surrounding viaticals are mainly concerned about the potential, and on 
occasion documented, abuses that occur in connection with viaticals rather than on 
the fundamental ethicality of viaticals themselves.6
This focus on what can be called the ethicality of economic reality is intrigu-
ing because it implicitly assumes that the ethical concerns associated with viaticals 
can be overcome if those aspects of viaticals that have caused or can cause harm 
are improved (for example by regulation, improvements in the marketplace, more 
education of insurance professionals, etc.). However, a few researchers have ex-
plicitly called attention to problems associated with the ethicality of the economic 
idea behind viaticals.7 Duska for example points out that the negative reactions that 
individuals have toward such products might be because “life insurance policies 
owned by strangers, and in some cases speculators, are fundamentally in conflict 
with the very nature and primary purpose of a life insurance policy [which is] a 
purely altruistic product.”8 He goes on to point out that while viaticals and other in-
surance schemes might be innovative financial tools, they might also contribute to 
a commodification of an individual’s life and thus might not be socially desirable.9
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Another interesting characteristic of the debate surrounding viaticals, which 
Duska10 also points to is the tension between the negative moral responses by 
those unfamiliar with the industry (such as the general public) and the positive 
moral evaluations by industry insiders.11 From this, it seems as if the negative 
responses of the public and the ethical evaluations of the industry are not in 
alignment. This misalignment could be explained in terms of cognitive biases on 
both sides. On the one hand, the negative reactions of the general public might be 
due to the frequent reporting of abuses (availability bias). On the other hand, the 
positive evaluations by industry insiders might be a psychological mechanism to 
reduce discomfort from working in an industry that is perceived to be unsavory.12 
Even though cognitive biases probably do play an important role here, we be-
lieve that this misalignment in ethical evaluation has more to do with conflating 
concerns regarding the practice of viaticals and concerns regarding the viatical 
idea itself.
Given these interesting characteristics of the viaticals debate, this paper will 
offer a systematic ethical analysis of viaticals that leverages the distinction between 
the ethicality of an economic idea and the ethicality of its reality (or practice) to 
isolate and discuss the fundamental ethical problems of viaticals. We believe that 
in order to determine whether an economic practice or product is ethical, there 
are essentially two questions that need to be answered. The first is whether under 
ideal circumstances the product or practice is or can be used ethically. The second 
is whether it is possible that one can achieve that ideal circumstance in practice. 
With few exceptions, discussions on the ethicality of viaticals usually focus on 
the second question and either do not see or ignore the first question. That is, they 
focus on the problems of the implementation and practice of viaticals rather than 
the moral nature of the practice itself. However, we believe that the first ques-
tion has priority, and if it is answered in the negative, then, naturally, a positive 
answer to the second question is not possible. By unpacking the evaluative content 
of our negative emotiional reactions to viaticals, we show that, even under ideal 
circumstances, the economic idea of viaticals is, at its core, unethical. However, 
recognizing that the viaticals industry is a legal and an economic reality that is 
growing rapidly, we also explore the second question and attempt to delineate, 
and discuss, the practical problems of the industry. We believe that the general 
structure of this case study can be used to discuss the ethical viability of other 
economic practices as well.
To develop the above argument the paper proceeds as follows. First, we give 
a description of viaticals and the regulatory environment. Second, we discuss the 
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practical problems that arise in connection with viaticals and whether they can be 
remedied. And third, by unpacking the evaluative content of our negative emo-
tional reactions to viaticals, we show that the economic idea itself is unethical.
The Economic and Legal Environment of Viaticals
In a viatical settlement the seller (called a “viator”) sells his or her life insurance 
policy to a viatical settlement company (called a “provider”) for a lump sum pay-
ment that is a percentage of the policy’s face value.13 The viatical provider then 
becomes the beneficiary of the policy, and is responsible for making any ongoing 
premium payments. When the viator dies, the viatical provider collects the full 
face value of the policy. When one buys a viatical, it represents the purchase of 
an insurance policy of a terminally ill person at a discounted price. The viatical 
provider can either hold the investment for themselves or they may act as a broker 
on behalf of some other investor. Either way, in theory, the ill person gets needed 
money to help pay expenses before his death and the investor gets the full face 
value of the policy when the person dies.
Viatical settlements are a type of life settlements.14 The main difference 
between a viatical and a life settlement is that the former usually involves poli-
cyholders with medical conditions that are likely to result in two years or less of 
life expectancy, whereas life settlements typically involve people over sixty-five 
who are not currently ill. However, the legal foundation for both instruments is 
the same. It was the Supreme Court decision of Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 
(1911) which provided the legal basis for viatical and life settlements. Dr. A. H. 
Grigsby treated a patient who wished to pay for his surgery by selling his life 
insurance policy to Dr. Grigsby. When the doctor tried to collect after the patient’s 
death, the executor of the estate issued a legal challenge. Eventually the case was 
appealed to the Supreme Court where the fundamental principle was established 
that a life insurance policy is private property and therefore can be assigned or 
disposed of at will by the owner like any of his other property.15
Despite this very early legal precedent, viaticals really didn’t start to become 
common until the 1980s when the AIDS crisis occurred. Many of the early victims 
of AIDS were young gay men who did not always have traditional dependents 
compared to the more typical policy holder. In addition, several members of this 
group were very willing to participate in experimental medical treatments that 
frequently were not covered by their traditional healthcare insurance. Therefore, 
the ability of viaticals to allow patients to access funds for treatment or living 
expenses while still alive increased demand on the patient side. In addition, the 
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medical developments that existed at that point in history typically did not result 
in major extensions of life expectancy after formal diagnosis. This in turn meant 
the investor side had some predictability when forecasting payoff and return on 
investment.
Since the start of the AIDS crisis, the public awareness over time of the con-
cept of selling one’s life insurance benefit to a third party increased to the general 
public. Eventually, inquires among older individuals who were not terminally ill 
started to become much more common. This was especially so for individuals 
who held whole life policies and wanted more funds to enjoy retirement. Typical-
ly, the negotiated price to collect on a whole-life policy death benefit is something 
less than the full death benefit but it is always greater than the existing cash value 
of the policy. The buyer pays less than the full death benefit in order to represent 
a) a time value of money discount, b) the risk associated with the uncertainty of 
the life expectancy of the original policyholder, c) possible assumption of on-
going premium payments and d) the potential for lawsuits by dependents after 
the fact.16
Even though viatical settlements are not legally considered securities, they 
are nevertheless subject to legal regulation. In the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Congress officially defined the terms “viati-
cal settlement provider” and “terminally and chronically ill insured’s.” Under this 
Act, a viatical settlement provider is defined as any person or entity who regu-
larly engaged in the trade or business of viatical settlements.17 Additionally the 
act created an incentive for viatical settlements by granting them preferential tax 
treatment in the sense of excluding viaticals from gross income as of January 1, 
1996. This was done by treating viatical settlements as equivalent to the proceeds 
of a life insurance contract payable by reason of death, which thus excludes it (for 
now) from gross income if the contract meets certain IRS compliances.18
In the area of tax law and entitlements, it is possible that the payments from 
viatical settlements could affect the viator’s eligibility for benefits because a large 
enough cash payment can trigger the loss of disability income. To have viatical 
income be excluded in calculating eligibility for benefits, specific criteria must be 
met under 26 U.S.C. Section 101. Therefore it is not automatic that all viaticals 
receive preferential tax treatment on all cases.19
Ethical Concerns and Arguments Associated with the Practice of Viaticals
Since the emergence of viaticals as a form of life settlement, a variety of ethical 
concerns have been raised. Most of these concerns, which we examine in this 
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section, relate to the empirical reality of how the buying and selling of viaticals is 
conducted. Particularly in the early days of viaticals, the terminally ill were often 
taken advantage of and the harms to individuals outweighed the benefits for sellers 
as well as buyers. Below we examine the potential benefits and harms/risks to the 
viatical parties.
Since the buyer provides the previous policy owner with an amount less than 
the full face value of the insurance policy, typically 30–80 percent, the potential 
return to the investor can be quite high.20 In addition, the payout of a life insur-
ance policy is many times counted as tax free income just as if it were paid to the 
original holder of the policy. On the other hand, a viatical settlement company that 
chooses to purchase a viatical as a potential investment faces a number of potential 
risks. One risk of both viaticals and life settlements is that with improving medi-
cal care, the ill or older person may actually live longer than expected. If the new 
owner of the policy has to pay the premiums to keep the policy in force, this would 
tie up additional capital and thus reduce the net return on the investment. Another 
concern is the possibility that the viator’s heirs may challenge the changes made 
to the policy, and thus the payoff is tied up in litigation for some period before 
collection. Information asymmetry can also lead to a higher probability of fraud. 
For example, the insured person might fake an illness simply to collect cash by 
selling the policy. Alternatively, viatical companies might recruit ill but uninsured 
individuals and encourage them to obtain policies that could then be cancelled 
by the insurance company if the fraud is discovered, thus harming investors who 
purchased the viaticals.21
While concerns about viaticals have often focused on possible downsides 
to the sellers of the policies there are numerous benefits that sellers can realize. 
Most of these benefits stem from the ability to get income now rather than after 
one’s death. For instance, a viatical can provide for the relief of monthly premium 
expenses. This would be especially important if the viator was in a cash flow bind 
that would have caused the missing of premiums and therefore the cancelling of 
the policy altogether. Selling the policy now would totally eliminate that risk. A 
companion benefit is the ability to receive an immediate infusion of cash that 
would allow the viator to deal with financial burdens that are in excess of the 
premium payments themselves. Such burdens could include offsetting the loss of 
current income caused by being unable to work or paying for treatments that are 
not covered by health insurance. In addition, some viators simply benefit from 
having the ability to control the use of the insurance money while they are still 
alive. By selling the settlement now, the viator guarantees that the funds will be 
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used for the intended use and therefore the potential ability of heirs to use the 
funds for purposes that are not desired is eliminated. Another benefit of viaticals 
comes from the current state of tax law. For the time being, lawsuit and insurance 
settlements are generally tax free because they are not considered ordinary in-
come in most circumstances. Therefore the government generally does not tax the 
payouts of viaticals because they are merely the rearrangement of a pre-existing, 
tax-free cash flow.
However, despite these benefits there are some potential downsides of viati-
cals for the sellers as well. Initially it would seem that receiving a lump sum, cash 
distribution would totally eliminate all financial risk for the seller of the viatical. 
However this might not necessarily be true. Various clauses and conditions embed-
ded in the policy as well as some external issues may complicate the situation. For 
instance, if the policy was designed not just to insure one person but also the lives 
of a spouse or other family member, then these individuals’ coverage is potentially 
lost when the policy sold. Similarly, there is also the potential loss of other rights 
or benefits, including conversion rights and waivers of premium benefits that may 
exist under the current terms of the policy. Another potential risk is that if the level 
of sophistication of the advice given to the viator is not sufficient, the amount 
of premiums one had paid may exceed the relative size of the cash settlement 
received depending upon how the deal is structured. This is especially true given 
that the policy cash values or dividends that the insured was originally counting on 
for income purposes are now forfeited to the investor.
Even if the above risks do not materialize, there still is the possibility that the 
viator may get blindsided by things that are not related to the terms of the policy. 
One such risk is that there is the possibility of tax consequences to the viator 
depending upon which state regulations apply. Or alternatively, the viator may 
find at risk his ability to receive services and benefits such as supplemental social 
security income, public assistance, and public medical services such as Medicaid.
A central concern surrounding the realization of the potential benefits of 
viaticals, particularly those of the seller, is the ability of the seller to make an 
autonomous and informed decision in an environment that is usually characterized 
by information asymmetry, a restricted set of choices, and emotional stress.22 On 
one hand the buyer of viaticals (or the investor) is more sophisticated and more 
knowledgeable than the viator is about the financial and legal aspects of the trans-
action. On the other hand, the seller has significantly more information concerning 
the state of health of the insured because the viator lives with the supposed medi-
cal condition on a daily basis.
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Furthermore the viaticals seller is usually faced with death and is in a weak-
ened physical, mental and financial condition and thus might not be in a position 
to look for or negotiate for the best available settlement, thus allowing companies 
to offer excessively small settlements:
In the absence of standards, it’s hard for viators to know whether they got a 
fair deal, though too often they do not. Joseph Belth, editor of Insurance Fo-
rum, a consumer-oriented industry newsletter, studied viatical transactions 
between 1994 and 1998 arranged by eight companies in Florida. He found 
that payment ratios varied from as low as 22 percent of a policy’s death 
benefit to as much as 60 percent. Even within the same company, Belth 
found, similar policies paid out different proportions. Accelerated Benefits, 
an Orlando firm, for example, paid 25 percent, 33 percent, and 40 percent 
of death benefits to three HIV patients, each with a life expectancy of 48 
months, who owned whole-life policies. The surprisingly wide variation, 
explains Jess LaMonda, Accelerated’s president, is due to differences in 
premiums, brokers’ fees, and loans against the policies.23
A variation of the above argument is that potential viators do not have the 
time or resources to thoroughly research their options and explore the potential 
for lost state and federal benefits. This argument is supported by the reasonable 
observation that while viatical companies have to compete against each other to 
provide a “reasonable” price, they do not have an economic interest to investigate 
all possible ramifications from the viewpoint of every single viator. And even if 
such an economic rationale could be created, viatical companies may not be able 
to do so given privacy laws and the lack of willingness of a viator to share all his 
personal information during the negotiating process.
Another concern that arises in connection of viaticals is the potential infringe-
ment on a persons’ right to privacy. In order to determine the level of risk involved 
in purchasing a policy or an investment based on a pool of policies, there is an 
interest on the side of the buyer to find out as much personal information from the 
insured about his/her health condition as possible and then track this information 
throughout the life of the policy. However, the insured might like such information 
to remain private or restricted to a limited group of individuals. Since there might 
not be legal provisions for these circumstances in a given state, it is possible that 
one’s medical condition will be tracked by investors for the rest of a viator’s life.24 
The availability of identifying information might expose the viator to a higher 
risk from foul play as well.25 For example, a current viatical sales person had been 
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convicted of being a middle man in a murder for hire on a family in exchange for 
proceeds from life insurance benefits.26
In summary, an analysis of the common ethical concerns surrounding vi-
aticals indicates that there are significant benefits to the different parties involved 
in this practice. However, the positive effects are in tension with concerns about 
decision autonomy, privacy and potential negative effects on the interests of the 
parties involved. The initial moral intuition about this practice focuses on the 
decision autonomy of the viator due to the particularly difficult circumstances 
viators are usually in. The sick and weak are considered deserving of a heightened 
level of care and protection and violations of this principle of care are morally 
problematic. The titles of earlier papers written on the subject of viaticals clearly 
show the underlying tension between the special moral considerations that attach 
to death and the economic potentials arising from such situations: “rolling the dice 
on death,”27 “betting on death,”28 or “making a killing.”29
The main ethical challenge in practice thus becomes to balance the increased 
duty of care with the economic interest and benefits viaticals can provide if they 
are offered in a way that minimizes the possible harms. In other words, is it feasi-
ble to offer viaticals in a way that would meet ethical expectations? This question 
is an important one because economic practices are often supported by pointing 
out their benefits and reducing ethical concerns about harms to practical problems 
that await a solution. Thus moral emotions are seen as an indication of areas that 
need improvement rather than an indication that a practice itself might be ethically 
untenable overall. The following section will examine in more detail what possible 
improvements to the practice of viaticals have been suggested or implemented to 
address the ethical challenges mentioned earlier.
Responses to Ethical Challenges of Viatical Practice
There are several possibilities to avoid or limit the harms that both seller and pur-
chaser can experience in the process of a viatical settlement. One possibility is 
to increase regulation and oversight through federal and state laws in order to 
curb abuses and/or mandate more information disclosure and additional licensure. 
Another possibility is to allow the industry to create its own internal regulation 
mechanisms through the introduction of more stringent professional responsibility 
requirements. Lastly, viatical sellers can be exposed to more information about the 
product, implications of various choices and available alternatives, for example 
through information campaigns sponsored by non-profit, non-governmental or 
government organizations.
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As a general trend, the attempts at the Federal level for additional regulation 
have been somewhat limited. One example of this concerns the selling of fractional 
interests in a patient’s insurance policy to retail investors called “fractionalizing.” 
In such a process the investors may purchase as little as 3 percent of the benefits 
of an insurance policy. The purpose for this practice is to increase liquidity and 
to spread risk among a number of different investors. The SEC had attempted to 
regulate this process and the resulting market, but the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia in Pardo III denied the Commission jurisdiction.30
At the state level, governments originally had difficulty regulating such 
contracts and their secondary markets under traditional buyer-seller laws. Later 
regulations in some states were eventually incorporated in the insurance sections 
of state codes, thereby giving state insurance commissioners and administra-
tors some authority. These regulations typically would require aspects of full 
disclosure, voluntary consent, confidentiality guarantees, and protection from 
unfair competition, recording duties, licensing, and minimum discount rates. For 
example with regard to minimum benefits the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) developed a regulation that would require a minimum 
payment to viators based on life expectancy. Only nine states have so far adopted 
this payment scale.31 Other requirements included in the model act proposed by 
the NAIC regard licensure (a license would be required to sell viaticals—currently 
even real estate agents can sell viaticals in twenty-five states). Other restrictions 
relate to advertising; for example terms like “guaranteed” or “safe” cannot be used 
(NAIC). However, many states still have not implemented such requirements in 
their state regulations.32
While it is questionable whether legal regulation can be successfully imple-
mented, given the questionable jurisdiction of the SEC and the inconsistency of 
responses on the state level, another possibility is for the industry to self regulate. 
This self-regulation could take the form of increased responsibilities expected 
from professionals who deal in viaticals, similar to codes of conduct in the real 
estate industry33 or the code of conduct of the certified financial planners board of 
standards.34 As with federal or state legislation proposals, these responsibilities 
would aim at addressing problems of disclosure, protecting decision autonomy, or 
guaranteeing a set of minimum benefits.
Unfortunately the success of industry self-regulation is questionable35 and 
depends on a variety of conditions, such as effective oversight, sanctioning and 
other reporting systems. Given that the viators are in a significantly weakened 
state due to illness or age it is not clear whether reporting of code violations for 
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example would be very likely. However, there exist successful models of industry 
self-regulation and it is conceivable that a successful model could be developed for 
the viaticals industry as well.
A third option for mitigating negative effects from viaticals is to increase 
the autonomy of the involved parties by providing more information about the 
product as well as available alternatives. Public information campaigns can 
prove effective as vehicles to achieve policy results,36 such as for example around 
smoking, family planning, safety, etc. However, it is not clear that the issue of 
viaticals would first warrant and elicit the involvement of organizations that could 
mount such campaigns, and second overcome obstacles to effectiveness that lie 
in message context and interpretation, target group reach, etc.37 Particularly since 
the individual circumstances viators find themselves in and the challenges that 
each of them face are different, it would be difficult to create a unified and ef-
fective message that individuals could respond to. Furthermore, as mentioned 
above, individuals considering life settlements are most likely in a weakened state 
(mentally and physically) that might reduce their capacity to absorb additional 
information.38 While it is conceivable that individuals could see messages about 
viaticals before they will be in need of them, it is not likely that this information 
will find fertile ground, given that individuals systematically underestimate that 
bad things will happen to them and thus discount information associated with 
such events.39
In summary, options and opportunities exist to ameliorate the potential 
harms associated with viatical settlements. While the success of the options dis-
cussed above is questionable, there is nevertheless the possibility to make viati-
cals, as an economic practice less harmful and subject to abuse than it currently 
is. This would mean that the public’s negative moral evaluation of viaticals as 
they are currently practiced might change when the economic reality catches up 
with moral expectations, at least regarding some moral concerns. It seems, how-
ever, that such a change in economic reality is quite unlikely. We argue, even if 
such changes could be implemented, other ethical challenges to the practice, we 
believe, remain insurmountable. In fact, even the best economic circumstances 
do not reduce or eliminate the negative emotional reaction that viaticals are in 
essence morbid.
After examining the ethical underpinnings of viaticals in the next section it 
should become clear why our negative emotional reaction to viaticals indicates that 
something is morally wrong with the practice itself, not with its implementation. 
Moreover, this case study also provides evidence that such emotional reactions, in 
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general, can be used as moral indicators (signals) that some economic transactions 
(ideas) are not just morally suspect given the state of a particular industry, but that 
they cross the line between markets and morality (economic value and human 
value) and that such economic ideas should not be put in practice in the first place. 
In the end, some things should not be for sale, and viaticals is one of them.
Why Viaticals are Morbid
Our moral intuitions manifest themselves in emotional responses to ethically 
questionable actions, practices, and institutions. Seeing someone help another 
person in need usually causes feeling of hope and joy, or reading about human 
trafficking in the newspaper gives rise to emotions such as anger and compassion. 
Commonly these emotions are considered blind irrational (or nonrational) bodily 
reactions to these situations and, at best, indicate that something might be right or 
wrong in a given situation. However, practitioners from psychology to philosophy 
have recognized that moral emotions are not irrational bodily movements but, in 
fact, have moral evaluative content. For example Cushman et al.40 found that our 
moral intuitions express certain moral principles that are subconsciously active 
and Heidt41 argued that they reflect societal norms that shape a person’s value 
system. Importantly, Martha Nussbaum in her work Upheavals of Thought42 ar-
gues that our moral emotions are, in an important sense, cognitive in nature and 
always involve moral evaluations. Emotions, for Nussbaum, provide us with moral 
knowledge that can be both cognitive and affective. Hence, moral emotions play a 
critical role in our moral appraisals and should be leverage when assessing ethical 
challenges. Given this, unpacking our negative emotional responses to viaticals is 
vital to assessing its ethical viability.
As we discussed in the last two sections, the main line of discussion about the 
ethical viability of viaticals has tended to focus on the “reality” or implementation 
of viaticals. The argument goes, that if we can just fix the problems of information 
asymmetry, decision autonomy, and common abuses through regulations that our 
negative emotional reactions to viaticals will be assuaged. As a previous examina-
tion of viaticals argues,43 the negative emotional responses to this practice are the 
result of the frequent abuses that industry outsiders perceive without recognizing 
the benefits that industry insiders see in the practice. In other words, our emotional 
responses are the result of an information deficit; thus indicating that there is room 
to improve the practice. But after a closer examination of the main theoretical 
arguments behind viaticals, we will see that just fixing the “reality” of the practice 
papers over the morbidity of the practice itself.
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The two strongest, and most popular, theoretical arguments for viaticals, we 
believe, are based on the viator’s property right to sell his or her policy, and the 
right of the viator to live out his or her life in dignity, and that viaticals are one 
way to exercise that right. Let’s examine property rights first. As we saw earlier, 
the legal grounding of viaticals is based on the idea that life insurance policies are 
considered property and fall under the purview of property rights. The traditional 
rights associated with ownership “include the claim-rights to possess, use, man-
age, and receive income; the powers to transfer, waive, exclude, and abandon; the 
liberties to consume or destroy; immunity from expropriation; the duty not to use 
harmfully; and liability for execution to satisfy a court judgment.”44 Thus, from 
a property rights perspective, an insured person should be able to change a ben-
eficiary or sell the policy even to someone who might not have an interest in the 
insured’s continued life and well-being,45 particularly if the insured is terminally 
ill and would need the funds to ease the financial burden of the illness.46
However, not everything is up for sale such as second kidneys, people, and 
illegal or prescription drugs. Viaticals, we argue, should be placed in the same 
category. Of course a person has a right to buy life insurance to protect one’s fam-
ily against the insured’s early death. The insurer, in this transaction, is explicitly 
interested in the insured’s survival. But if a terminally ill person tries to sell his 
or her insurance policy as a viatical, the moral value of the property changes 
because the buyer is betting on the viator’s death. The important change that 
takes place when a life insurance policy is sold is the removal of the so-called 
“insurable interest” from the relationship between the beneficiary of the policy 
and the insured person. Insurable interest can be defined as a substantial interest 
grounded either in “love and affection” or an economic interest in the continued 
life and well-being of the insured.47 Insurable interest is legally required in order 
to purchase a life insurance policy in the first place. Without it, people could 
potentially take out life insurance policies on anybody they wanted, opening the 
door to nefarious activities, such as purchasing policies on terminally ill people. 
In fact, in eighteenth century England it was a “sport” to take out speculative life 
insurance on public persons, without their knowledge or consent, once it became 
known that they were seriously ill. Speculators were basically betting on how 
long someone would live and “the premiums on new policies on such persons 
fluctuated from day to day in accordance with the reports or rumors on their 
condition.”48 To stop this practice parliament enacted a law in 1774 that required 
purchasers to have an insurable interest in those they wanted to insure.49 Viaticals 
essentially remove the insurable interest, leaving only the investor’s economic 
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interest in the quick death of the viator. Thus, viaticals changes the moral value 
of the property.
This shift from betting on one’s survival to betting on one’s death substantially 
changes not only the moral value of the property, but more importantly, the moral 
dynamic between the buyer and seller in such a way that is morally harmful to 
both parties. This objection is not new. It has an interesting history that illustrates 
the ethical problems with viaticals. An earlier, and one could argue cruder, form 
of viaticals can be seen in nineteenth century England. If people could not pay 
the premiums on their insurance policies they could sell them at public auctions 
at which time speculators could publicly examine the insured persons—a practice 
that Elizur Wright, an abolitionist who was visiting England at the time, compared 
to slave auctions.50 Though viatical investors today do not publically examine po-
tential viators, they nevertheless do a thorough medical history on the seller.
In modern times, Sandel51 describes a case from the The New York Times 
where an investor grows increasing upset that he is not harvesting a profit from 
his viaticals investment because his viator, Kendall Morrison, who was dying of 
AIDS, did not die, but was returning to health after receiving new drugs. Dur-
ing this time the investor, and presumably the agents working on his behalf, kept 
calling and sending FedExes to see if Morrison was still alive.52 While this might 
appear to be an extreme case, it is nevertheless a logistical challenge for investors 
to determine when the insured has died so the investment can be harvested. Viati-
cal firms take various approaches to “tracking” their investments. For example, 
some give a stack of cards to the insured that he or she has to mail monthly and 
when a card does not arrive on schedule the “incident” is investigated. Yet others 
pay $250 to family members to notify the firm when the insured dies (a practice 
that some have compared to paying a bounty hunter).53 These examples might be 
either dismissed as sins of the past or borderline cases, but they clearly show that 
viaticals can undermine a person’s moral sense of respect and compassion for 
other people, essentially treating them as a commodity.
The seller is not immune from this change in moral sensibilities either. In 
1997, an article in The Advocate54 describes how AIDS patients attempted to 
lower their T cell counts to get a bigger viatical pay outs. It describes how one 
potential viator, in order to have a bad medical profile, stopped taking his protease 
inhibitors. But as Scott Page, a president of a viaticals company at the time, points 
out “if you stop taking the drugs then you can build a resistance, and when you 
start again there are not as effective. It’s Russian roulette with an AIDS bullet.” 
The potential viator in this case is willing to die sooner in order to get larger settle-
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ment. In other words, viaticals can cause the terminally ill person to views his or 
her life as a commodity that can be bought and sold, not as a unique life that has 
intrinsic moral worth. Therefore, viaticals create morally perverse incentives that 
undercut the value and dignity of human life. Moreover, it cuts away at the moral 
ties that bind a just society together, namely the principles of mutual dignity and 
respect, and the virtues, such as compassion, that follow from them. We believe 
that this is, at bottom, what our negative moral emotional response of morbidity 
is expressing.
This objection can also be leverage against the claim that viaticals are nec-
essary to help terminally ill people to live out their lives with dignity. It is true 
that some terminally ill people are under enormous financial pressure to keep 
up with escalating medical costs and living expenses, and that viaticals industry 
can help relieve this pressure. However, we believe that they should not be put in 
this dire position in the first place, where, in many cases, they have no choice but 
to sell their policies. There are better ways to deal with this issue that does not 
have the negative consequences of corroding the moral sensibilities of the buyer 
and seller, and also undermines the basic moral principles that hold a just society 
together. For example , insurance companies could expand accelerated benefits 
where the death benefit is paid out to an insured person with confirmed low life 
expectancy (for example less than 6 months) or they could adjust the cash value of 
a life insurance policy that an insured can obtain when surrendering their policy 
to the insurance company based on the insured’s health.55 Alternatively, on a much 
broader level, one could advocate for universal health care, which would presum-
ably lower the chances that ill persons might face severe financial stress due to 
medical treatment.
Furthermore, by putting a terminally ill person in a seemingly impossible 
position of having to sell his policy to make ends meet also undercuts his duty (or 
obligation) of care to the original beneficiaries of the policy. Life insurance was 
originally designed to offer financial support for the family of a deceased to help 
them adjust to the loss of a source of income and new life circumstances. In taking 
out an insurance policy, the policy holder makes at least an implicit promise to 
the beneficiaries that they will be supported in case of the policy holder’s death. 
Over the generally long duration of such a policy beneficiaries make life choices 
that can take this promise into account. For example, the wife of a policyholder 
might forgo building a career knowing that a life insurance would offer sufficient 
support for a chosen way of life in case of the death of the primary breadwinner. 
So the option of selling a policy undermines the policyholder’s responsibilities 
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to his beneficiaries and also the beneficiaries’ expectations that the policy will be 
there when needed. In some circumstances the “beneficiary may feel pressured to 
approve the sale [of the life insurance policy] because opposition to the insured’s 
wishes would appear to be based on the beneficiary’s financial interest in reten-
tion of the policy.”56 In other circumstances the insured might even sell the policy 
without the knowledge of the beneficiary who might still rely on it.57
Proponents of viaticals could argue that these objections go too far and can 
be used against other industries as well. If viaticals are inherently unethical be-
cause they profit from sickness and death, then so are doctors and funeral direc-
tors who also profit from sickness and death. Essentially, viaticals, they argue, 
are in the same moral category as doctors and funeral directors. In response, we 
argue that of course doctors and funeral directors profit from sickness and death, 
but they, unlike the viaticals industry, are working from the moral standpoint 
of either making sick people better or helping families deal with the loss of a 
loved one. In essence doctors and funeral directors are not investing in the early 
demise of terminally ill people, but helping people manage the inevitabilities of 
life. However, in the case of viaticals, death becomes an impersonal economic 
event for viatical providers because death initiates the payout of an investment. 
This event should, from the perspective of the investor, occur as soon as possible 
because the timing determines the level of return for the investment. There is 
usually no interaction with the decedents or their grief. Funeral directors also 
can be said to experience death as the starting point for an economic transaction, 
but they mainly focus their efforts on providing families with a service in their 
time of grief. In fact, this focus is a central element in the self-conception of this 
profession and is expressed throughout the code of professional conduct.58 This 
is why we have negative emotional responses to viaticals and not to doctors or 
funeral directors.
Another way to get at the morbidity of viaticals is to construct a “perfect 
case” scenario of a viatical transaction and see if the arguments we presented 
above still hold. Imagine a terminally ill person, without family or beneficiaries, 
no medical bills, financially stable, lives in a state that has good regulations, and 
well informed about the nature of viaticals. This person wants to sell his policy 
so that he can live the last days of his life on a tropical island in the South Pacific. 
This may alleviate the problems with the realities of the viatical market, but not 
its moral problems. This scenario does not shake off the problem of undermining 
the moral sensibilities of the buyer and seller. Again, viaticals, at their core, turn 
human life into a commodity, thereby undercutting the natural respect and dignity 
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of persons. As we mentioned above, with no insurable interest, the structure of the 
transaction encourages the viatical investor to see the viator as a commodity, and 
essentially turns what was originally a bet on life into a bet on death.
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an analysis of the ethical issues surrounding vi-
atical settlements. By distinguishing the ethical challenges that relate to the way 
viaticals are bought and sold from ethical challenges that relate to the idea of 
viaticals we have tried to show that viaticals are unethical. They are unethical 
not because solutions to practical ethical challenges remain elusive but because 
certain human experiences should be shielded from economic interference. 
Anderson59 in her work Value and Ethics in Economics, and Sandel60 in What 
Money Can’t Buy address the problem of mixing economic and non-economic 
spheres in various areas of our lives. Both argue that the injection of economics 
into practices that are emotional, sacred, and deserving of dignity assumes that 
these values can be traded off with economic benefits, but they believe that some 
values are incommensurable with economics.61 In the case of viaticals, our nega-
tive moral responses are telling us something important about the tension between 
the economic and non-economic spheres of life. Viaticals make death not only 
an economic transaction for those left behind (during arrangement of funerals, 
administration of wills, etc.) but also beforehand for the individual who is going 
to die.
Viaticals industry insiders have tried to separate the personal sphere from 
the economic sphere in an effort to perhaps increase legitimacy of viaticals by 
invoking the progress that a rational perspective on death and dying provides for 
society. They have also pointed out that economic transactions occur in the context 
of illness and death all the time because undertakers and doctors also make a living 
because people get sick and die. However, the emotional reaction people tend to 
have when evaluating viaticals are usually absent when evaluating medical and 
funeral services, which is an indication that the way the economic sphere touches 
the personal sphere in viatical transactions is fundamentally different from the 
way other death and illness-related services do. Thus our moral emotions and intu-
ition can be used to show that the boundaries of moral discourse need to be pushed 
toward a clearer distinction between theory and practice. They also demonstrate 
the importance of moving beyond utilitarian concerns toward notions of rights, 
relationships and values.
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